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Abstract Over recent years the label ‘‘synthetic biology’’
has been attached to a number of diverse research and
commercial activities, ranging from the search for a min-
imal cell to the quick delivery of customized genes by
DNA synthesis companies. Based on the analysis of bio-
security issues surrounding synthetic biology during the
SYNBIOSAFE project, this paper will ﬁrst provide a
rationale for taking security, in addition to safety aspects of
this new ﬁeld, seriously. It will then take stock of the ini-
tiatives and measures that have already been taken in this
area and will lastly try to map out future areas of activities
in order to minimise the security risks emanating from this
promising new ﬁeld of scientiﬁc inquiry and technological
progress.
Keywords Synthetic biology  Security  5P strategy
Introduction: why think about the security of synthetic
biology?
Synthetic biology (SB) has developed into one of the most
dynamic sub-ﬁelds of the life sciences and has come to be
used as the umbrella term for different approaches ranging
from large-scale assembly of DNA to the developments of
new tools and technology platforms to the search for the
minimal cell and the origins of life. While there is wide-
spread hope related to the positive beneﬁts that might be
derived from this new ‘‘techno-science’’ (Schmidt et al.
2009), the discourse on the societal implications has also
witnessed a healthy dose of analysis of the potential risks
SB might entail. In addition, a ﬁrst prioritisation of the
societal issues of immediate concern has been undertaken
(SYNBIOSAFE 2009).
There are at least three sets of issues that warrant a
separate and systematic analysis of potential SB security
risks. Firstly, bio-security concerns are not just a relabeling
of bio-safety issues that may have been addressed during
debates on genetically modiﬁed organisms. While bio-
safety measures aim at the prevention of unintentional
exposure to harmful or potentially harmful biological
agents and material, or their accidental release, bio-security
measures focus on preventing the misuse through for
example loss, theft, diversion or intentional release of
harmful or potentially harmful biological agents and
materials. While the pursuit of bio-safety and bio-security
goals is thus mostly complementary with a large area of
overlap between them, there are certain instances in which
the bio-security and bio-safety goals may point at contra-
dictory policies.
One such example is provided in a background paper of
the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) for the 1972 Bio-
logical and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Having
been set up by the sixth quinquennial Review Conference
of the BWC, the ISU is tasked to assist BWC member
states in implementing the provisions of that treaty and in
preparing and conducting the annual meetings of BWC
experts and states parties. The 2008 ISU background paper
states that a ‘‘common example of conﬂict arises with the
transport of dangerous pathogens: in the interests of bio-
safety, such pathogens should be clearly labelled during
transport, but from a biosecurity perspective, labelling the
pathogen being shipped may increase the risk of theft or
diversion’’ (ISU 2008, p. 3). The same background docu-
ment prepared by the ISU also pointed out that ‘‘[b]iosafety
is a well-established concept with a widely accepted
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practice at the national level. Biosecurity is a compara-
tively new term, with divergent meanings depending upon
the setting in which it is used’’ (ISU 2008, p. 2). It is thus
fair to conclude that among the core areas of past research
and debate on the ethical, social and legal implications of
the revolution in the life sciences it is the bio-security
aspect that has received least attention.
The second set of concerns is related to a pattern of past
misuse of advances in the life sciences. As Dando (1999)
has demonstrated, major scientiﬁc developments in the life
sciences have led to ever more sophisticated offensive
state-level biological weapons (BW) programmes
throughout the twentieth century. Insights into bacteriology
gained in the late nineteenth century found their way into
the rather crude biological sabotage programmes of the
First World War (Wheelis 1999). Likewise, advances in
aerobiology and virology in the middle of the twentieth
century were utilised by ‘‘major global powers’’ who
‘‘invested substantial resources to develop a strategic BW
capability aimed at the military forces, civilian populations,
or agricultural resources of their adversaries’’ (Wheelis
et al. 2006, p. 1). Later on, the early stages of genetic
engineering were utilised in the clandestine Soviet BW
programme of the 1970s and 80s (Hart 2006). This pattern
of past misuse raises the spectre of twenty-ﬁrst century
advances in the life sciences—including synthetic biol-
ogy—also being misused as part of efforts to produce
advanced BW (Petro et al. 2003) or to simplify the
acquisition of known biological warfare agents. However,
as the above listing shows, the often voiced assessment that
the major bio-security risks at the beginning of the twenty-
ﬁrst century are resulting from terrorist groups’ interest in
the acquisition of BW may be based on a fundamental
misjudgement of the history of biological weapons acqui-
sition by states. Although some still equate the major bio-
security risk stemming from SB with bio-terrorist activities
(Balmer and Martin 2008) or maintain that the use of
biological weapons by terrorist organisations such as Al
Qaeda is practically inevitable (Hellmich and Redig 2007),
other scholars have warned not to overstate the bio-terrorist
threat (Sprinzak 2000), sought to set the historical record of
actual bio-terrorist incidents straight (Tucker 2000) and
cautioned that a thorough threat assessment has been sorely
missing from US government predictions of the likelihood
of a future bioterrorist event (Leitenberg 2005). Although
the occurrence of such events cannot be excluded com-
pletely, given this past record as well as the technological
hurdles involved in misusing SB or its applications in order
to do harm, it is more likely that the ‘‘fruits’’ of SB will be
ﬁrst abused in a state-level program. Should a bioterrorist
event occur, it is more likely that traditional biological
warfare agents will be utilised. It is therefore all the more
important that the SB community and the BW arms control
community—the latter of which continues to try to prevent
state-level BW programmes—expand the initial contacts
that have been established in recent years.
The third set of issues that necessitates taking the bio-
security risks of SB seriously is related to the fact that SB
has been identiﬁed by the bio-security community—
beyond those concerned with BW arms control—as an area
of concern. Most notably, the Committee on Advances in
Technology and the Prevention of their Application to Next
Generation Bioterrorism and Biological Warfare Threats,
the so-called Lemon-Relman committee of the US National
Research Council (National Research Council 2006) has
urged analysts and policy makers to look beyond lists of
potentially harmful biological agents, like those for
example on the US select agents list. Rejecting a list-based
approach as too limited, the Committee adopted a classi-
ﬁcation scheme for scientiﬁc and technological advances
containing four different groups, focussing on features that
different technologies have in common. Synthetic biology
features in relation to two of these four groups: ‘‘technol-
ogies that seek to acquire novel biological or molecular
diversity’’ and ‘‘technologies that seek to generate novel
but pre-determined and speciﬁc biological or molecular
entities through directed design’’ (National Research
Council 2006, p. 3). Following from this assessment, one of
the recommendations contained in the committee’s report
advocates the adoption of ‘a broadened awareness of
threats beyond the classical ‘‘select agents’’ and other
pathogenic organisms and toxins, so as to include, for
example, approaches for disrupting host homeostatic and
defense systems, and for creating synthetic organisms’
(National Research Council 2006, p. 177). As a set of
interviews with leading European SB practitioners
revealed, their awareness of the Lemon-Relman commit-
tee, its report and the implications ﬂowing from its work
was very low indeed (Kelle 2007).
Thus, bio-security awareness raising efforts are clearly
requiredaspartofamorecomprehensivestrategy toaddress
the bio-security implications of SB. Different approaches to
come to terms with the bio-security of SB will be brieﬂy
discussed in the following section before the elements of a
comprehensive 5P strategy are outlined thereafter.
How to think about securing synthetic biology—
towards the 5P strategy
Self-regulatory and technology-focused approaches
to bio-security governance of synthetic biology
Over the past few years two different trends have emerged
in relation to the bio-security governance of synthetic
86 A. Kelle
123biology. The ﬁrst of these is technology driven and has
been initially discussed by a large section of the SB com-
munity, e.g. during the SB2.0 conference in May 2006
(Conferees, SB2.0 2006) and has more recently been
advocated by representatives of DNA synthesis companies
and their industry associations. Over the past few years the
emergence of two such organisations could be observed:
the International Consortium for Polynucleotide Sequenc-
ing (ICPS) and the Industry—now renamed into Interna-
tional Association Synthetic Biology (IASB). While ICPS
has been revolving around mostly US-based DNA syn-
thesis companies, IASB founding members have been
German gene synthesis and bio-informatics companies. It
is worth noting that ICPS and the IASB are in the process
of merging and—in addition to the activities and proposals
described below—have begun outreach efforts to DNA
synthesis companies located outside Europe and the United
States.
The ﬁrst of these groups, the ICPS has proposed a
‘‘tiered DNA synthesis order screening process’’ (Bu ¨gl
et al. 2007). With it they propose that
individuals who place orders for DNA synthesis
would be required to identify themselves, their home
organisation and all relevant biosafety [sic] infor-
mation. Next, individual companies would use vali-
dated software tools to check synthesis orders against
a set of select agents or sequences to help ensure
regulatory compliance and ﬂag synthesis orders for
further review. Finally DNA synthesis and synthetic
biology companies would work together through the
ICPS, and interface with appropriate government
agencies (worldwide), to rapidly and continually
improve the underlying technologies used to screen
orders and identify potentially dangerous sequences,
as well as develop a clearly deﬁned process to report
behavior that falls outside of agreed-upon guidelines
(Ibid, p. 627).
DNA synthesis companies and their industry association
would reside at the centre of a governance structure that
would rely on ‘‘agreed-upon guidelines’’. Such guidelines
would be put into effect inter alia through lists of ‘‘select
agents or sequences’’ that would determine whether and
how to process DNA synthesis orders on the part of those
companies that follow the guidelines.
IASB activities agreed upon during a 2008 meeting also
put emphasis on DNA order screening, but additionally
emphasise the formulation and implementation of best
practices across the industry. One key element of such a
scheme is the agreement on an industry-wide code of
conduct. Oversight and enforcement of standards, however
are not regarded as falling into industry’s area of respon-
sibility. As clearly spelled out in the IASB workshop
report, ‘‘[u]ltimately, the deﬁnition of standards and the
enforcement of compliance with these is a government
task’’ (Industry Association Synthetic Biology 2008, p. 14).
The second, diverging, trend seems to be driven by those
in the synthetic biology community who are advocating
self-governance by the scientiﬁc community as the most
promising approach to follow. However, the evidentiary
basis of the assertion by some that ‘‘initiatives developed
by the synthetic biology community may be more effective
than government regulation precisely because they are
more likely to be respected and taken seriously’’ remains
somewhat in the dark (Maurer and Zoloth 2007). Clearly,
DNA synthesis companies and their associations, who are
currently at the forefront of formulating proposals and thus
setting the agenda for technical solutions to bio-security
risks of SB, are not adverse to government oversight and
regulation. This clearly comes out of the above mentioned
proposals and reports. Also, as one of the industry con-
tributors to the SYNBIOSAFE e-conference in spring 2008
pointed out, such oversight and regulation make two
important contributions to a larger governance system. It
ﬁrstly will ‘‘reassure the public that biosafety and biose-
curity concerns are addressed’’ and it secondly ‘‘would
provide legal security to the industry, by deﬁning clear
compliance rules’’ (SYNBIOSAFE 2008, p. 45).
The 5P strategy
In spite of the limitations of the above governance
approaches, they both serve an essentially important pur-
pose in that they contribute to raising the awareness of the
SB community about bio-security issues related to their
work. In light of the low level of bio-security awareness
among synthetic biologists—especially in the European
academic SB community (Kelle 2007)—any bio-security
governance system will have to include efforts to raise such
awareness in the scientiﬁc community. In addition, for the
SB subﬁeld of DNA synthesis, the efforts currently under
way including those aiming at the wide-spread adoption of
screening by DNA companies for potentially harmful
sequences and the adoption of a code of conduct for the
industry, plus the potential expansion of order screening to
oligo-providers in the future (Fischer 2009), are important
building blocks for a more comprehensive bio-security
governance strategy for SB.
When conceptualising such a more comprehensive
strategy it is important to take into consideration the lim-
itations of one of the core international instruments avail-
able at the international level to prevent the misuse of the
life sciences for nefarious purposes, i.e. the BWC. Most
importantly, Article I of the BWC does not cover research
on BW, but just development, acquisition, or stockpiling of
BW. It is therefore essential for any comprehensive bio-
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shortcoming on the international level of not being able to
address dual-use research activities that could be misused
for nefarious purposes.
Such a broader-based approach also needs to include all
stakeholders in the development of synthetic biology as a
discipline and its potential future applications. Ideally, it
would be equipped with some ﬂexibility to be able to
respond to different trajectories along which the ﬁeld might
develop. Such an overarching governance structure, based
on the 5P-strategy outlined below, would focus on ﬁve
different policy intervention points: the
• principal investigator (PI), the
• project, the
• premises, the
• provider (of genetic material) and, its
• purchaser.
The ﬁrst three ‘‘Ps’’ would take into account the research
character of much of what currently is synthetic biology and
thus provide important additions to the policy intervention
points recommended by the study on synthetic genomics
conducted by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies (CSIS) and the J Craig Venter Institute
(JCVI) (Garﬁnkel et al. 2007). The options discussed in
their report on synthetic genomics are both too narrow and
too wide in order to serve as a comprehensive bio-security
governance strategy for SB: they are too narrow, because
they focus only on synthetic genomics which the authors of
the report understand to combine ‘‘methods for the chemical
synthesis of DNA with computational techniques to design
it’’ (Garﬁnkel et al. 2007, p. 1). This clearly covers only one
of the subﬁelds of synthetic biology identiﬁed by O’Malley
et al. (2008), Schmidt (2009) or Deplazes (2009). At the
same time the options discussed are too wide because they
do not only focus on bio-security, but also take into account
laboratory bio-safety, environmental protection and other
concerns such as to ‘‘minimize costs and burdens to gov-
ernment and industry’’ (Garﬁnkel et al. 2007, p. 49).
In the ﬁrst instance, the matrix provided below is
intended to serve as a heuristic device to indentify and
discuss a number of different measures that are theoreti-
cally possible at each of the ﬁve policy intervention points
in order to address different bio-security risks, which vary
in their severity. As quite a few of these are potential future
threats whose actual manifestation cannot be predicted in
detail, at this point in time no deﬁnite risk assessments can
be conducted and consequently the appropriate level of
response cannot be known. In principle, the bio-security
measures for synthetic biology range from awareness
raising on part of the involved synthetic biologists to
education and training of current and future generations of
SB practitioners, codes of conduct, guidelines, regulation,
national laws, and international treaties.
The following table maps these types of bio-security
measuresagainsttheﬁvepolicyinterventionpoints.Itshould
be noted that the goal of constructing this matrix is not to try
and ﬁll all of the resulting ﬁelds necessarily with content.
One outcome of the proposed exercise may well be not to
advocate or pursue a particular policy intervention. How-
ever, utilising the matrix as a heuristic device should enable
SB stakeholders to identify governance structures that are
already available and applicable to SB, either from a bio-
security point of view, or from a related, e.g. bio-safety
informed, perspective. In extension of the above quoted
study by Garﬁnkel et al. it is proposed here not to mix bio-
safety and bio-security concerns, but instead to take into due
account the above mentioned limitations in utilizing bio-
safety measures in addressing bio-security risks. In other
words:totheextentthatbio-safetymeasuresare‘‘borrowed’’
forbio-securityrisk analysis they need to be investigated for
theiradaptabilityforabio-securitygovernancestructure.On
this basis the matrix can then serve as a tool for discussing
steps that need to be taken additionally in order to arrive at a
bio-security governance structure that provides the greatest
possible protection against the misuse of SB.
Potential bio-security measures in the context of the 5P-strategy
Potential bio-
security
measures
Policy intervention points
Principal
investigator
Project Premises Provider Purchaser
Awareness
raising
Education/
training
Guidelines
Codes of
conduct
Regulation
Natl laws
International
treaty/
agreement
An initial assessment of bio-security measures that have
already been mentioned would lead one to populate the
ﬁelds marked in the provider column, as those relate—at
least partly—to the DNA screening and other activities of
gene synthesis companies discussed above. These efforts,
however, are also embedded in international agreements
and national laws and regulations. The BWC for example
requires in Article IV all its member states to implement its
prohibitions within their own jurisdictions. Concerning the
88 A. Kelle
123non-transfer of BW-related materials, technologies and
know-how many states thus have established national
export control laws and regulations, which in turn have
been harmonised by a group of some 30 states in the
so-called Australia Group (AG) (Australia Group webpage
2006). The AGs guidelines and control lists are of rele-
vance in this context as are the counter-terrorism measures
contained United Nations Security Council 1540 resolution
and implemented by the Committee established through
this resolution. The 1540 Committee (1540 Committee
webpage 2007) aims at analysing which controls UN
member states have in place in order to prevent the unau-
thorised access to nuclear, biological and chemical mate-
rial, thus having a rather indirect effect—as does the
BWC—on the activities of individual researchers or
organisations. In contrast, the Australia Group control lists’
references to genetic material of controlled pathogenic
micro-organisms are much more SB-speciﬁc and have a
direct bearing especially on the activities of DNA synthesis
companies and their servicing of DNA orders from cus-
tomers abroad. The international layer of a SB bio-security
governance system could be further strengthened if the
proposal for a convention to criminalise BW-related
activities under international criminal law were to be
adopted by states (Meselson and Robinson 2001).
As these examples show, many national measures, be
they in the form of laws, regulations or guidelines, are
informed by international agreements. However, such a
link does not always exist. A case in point are the regu-
lations put in place to ensure the safety of biotechnology-
based research, development and production. As a recent
study on this issue has sought to demonstrate, certain
domestic bio-safety measures developed in a national
context during past debates on the ethical, social and legal
issues (ELSI) concerning rDNA based products are of rel-
evance for the ﬁrst generation of SB products (Rodemeyer
2009). As it addresses a mix of measures ranging from self-
governance to government regulation, this report provides
a good starting point for discussing bio-security gover-
nance measures at a national level. Yet, as has been pointed
out above, past ELSI debates have not systematically
included consideration of bio-security issues. Thus a
change in focus of the risk assessment is needed.
Some guidance about such risk assessment can be
derived from current thinking about laboratory bio-security
measures that aims at preventing the theft and malicious
misuse of dangerous biological agents. According to
Salerno and Gaudioso (2007) the bio-security risk in a
laboratory environment is the product of the threat poten-
tial of a biological agent being stolen and the consequences
of such an act involving the misuse of the agent. Salerno
and Gaudioso usefully also break down laboratory bio-
security into different component parts that require different
measures for different types of risks. They distinguish
between physical security, personnel security, material
control and accountability, transport security, and infor-
mation security. While such an agent-focussed approach
would need adapting to the characteristics of SB, especially
as the ﬁeld progresses and one moves away from the current
focus on the DNA synthesis subﬁeld, it would clearly allow
to address the double deﬁcit of the security-deﬁcit in past
ELSI debates and of international agreements like the BWC
which a priori excludes research activities to be addressed.
Lastly, the above mentioned study by Rodemeyer also
provides a useful reminder of the product driven focus of
US rDNA bio-safety regulations. ELSI debates and bio-
safety measures in Europe, in contrast, have been much
more process-focussed, with the mode of production, i.e.
the genetic modiﬁcation of a product, being of considerably
greater relevance than in the US context. These differences
between product and process-focussed approaches to risk
assessment might also enter the discourse on the most
appropriate set of bio-security governance measures that
the 5P matrix presented above seeks to facilitate.
Conclusions
This paper set out to provide a rationale for the separate bio-
security assessment of SB, in addition to the traditional
ELSI domains that have become familiar through the dis-
course on genetically modiﬁed organisms. It has identiﬁed
three elements of such a rationale for taking the bio-security
of SB seriously: ﬁrst, there is a clear pattern of past misuse
of advances in the life sciences for BW purposes; second,
bio-security is not equal to bio-safety, and in some instances
these two concerns may actually lead to conﬂicting policy
measures; third, at least since the publication of the Lemon-
Relman committee report in 2006 SB has been shining up
on the radar screens of bio-security analysts as one of the
subﬁelds in the life sciences that need monitoring.
Proposals for the bio-security governance of synthetic
biology broadly fall into two categories: those that put a
emphasis on self-governance by the SB community to
prevent misuse, and those that emphasises technical solu-
tions. As discussed, the second category provides necessary
building blocks for a comprehensive governance system,
but is not sufﬁcient to address the full range of bio-security
risks. This limitation is shared by all supply-side measures
that seek to restrict access to materials, technologies or
know-how through list-based controls. Attempts to estab-
lish a code of conduct are therefore as useful and necessary
a complement as systematic awareness raising and educa-
tional activities would be to the more technically orientated
supply-side control measures that have received the
greatest attention so far.
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to be broadened to include the different strands of the
scientiﬁc ﬁeld to which DNA synthesis contributes. In this
context, a 5P-strategy has been outlined that would con-
sider ﬁve different policy intervention points for which
adequate measures would need to be elaborated. It would
thus not only focus on the provider and purchaser of syn-
thesised DNA, but also the principal investigator, the
project, and the premises at which research is being con-
ducted. Such an integrated SB governance system would
need to be based on a bio-security risk assessment that
could well take current thinking on laboratory bio-security
as its starting point for a discourse involving all stake-
holders in this new and dynamic subﬁeld of the life sci-
ences. There currently exists a window of opportunity for
such a dialogue that may close once SB applications reach
a ‘‘plateau of productivity’’ (Schmidt 2009).
Acknowledgments This article is based on a presentation given at
the conference Applied Industrial Biology in Europe—Status Quo and
Perspectives, Freiburg, Germany, 16–17 April 2009. It has been
supported by a grant by the FWF (Austrian Science Fund) project
‘‘Investigating the biosafety and risk assessment needs of synthetic
biology in Austria (Europe) and China’’, project number I215-B17.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Australia Group webpage (2006) List of biological agents for export
control, July 2006. http://www.australiagroup.net/en/biological_
agents.html
Balmer A, Martin P (2008) Synthetic biology. Social and ethical
challenges. An independent review commissioned by the Bio-
technology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC).
http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/organisation/policies/reviews/scientiﬁc_
areas/0806_synthetic_biology.pdf
Bu ¨gl H, Danner JP, Molinari RJ, Mulligan JT, Park H-O, Reichert B,
Roth DA, Wagner R, Budowle B, Scripp R, Smith JAL, Steele
SJ, Church G, Endy D (2007) DNA synthesis and biological
security. Nat Biotechnol 25(6):627–629
Conferees, SB2.0 (2006) Public draft of the declaration of the second
international meeting on synthetic biology. http://hdl.handle.net/
1721.1/32982
Dando M (1999) The Impact of the development of modern biology
and medicine on the evolution of modern biological warfare
programmes in the twentieth century. Def Anal 15(1):51–65
Deplazes A (2009) Piecing together a puzzle. An exposition of
synthetic biology. EMBO Rep 10(5):428–432
Fischer M (2009) Synthetic biology—the industry’s perspective.
Presentation at the conference applied industrial biology in
Europe—statusquo and perspectives, Freiburg, Germany, 17April
Garﬁnkel MS, Endy D, Epstein GL, Friedmann RM (2007) Synthetic
genomics:optionsforgovernance.http://www.jcvi.org/cms/ﬁlead
min/site/research/projects/synthetic-genomics-report/synthetic-
genomics-report.pdf
Hart J (2006) The Soviet biological weapons program. In: Wheelis M,
Rozsa L, Dando M (eds) Deadly cultures. pp 132–156
Hellmich C, Redig AJ (2007) The question is when: the ideology of
Al Qaeda and the reality of bioterrorism. Stud Conﬂ Terror
30(5):375–396
Implementation Support Unit (2008) Biosafety and biosecurity. UN
document BWC/MSP/2008/MX/INF.1, Geneva. http://daccess
dds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/618/92/PDF/G0861892.pdf?
OpenElement
Industry Association Synthetic Biology (2008) Report on the
workshop ‘‘technical solutions for biosecurity in synthetic
biology’’. http://www.ia-sb.eu
Kelle A (2007) Synthetic biology and biosecurity awareness in
Europe, Vienna, IDC. http://www.synbiosafe.eu/uploads///pdf/
Synbiosafe-Biosecurity_awareness_in_Europe_Kelle.pdf
Leitenberg M (2005). Assessing the biological weapons and bioter-
rorism threat, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War
College. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.
cfm?PubID=639
Maurer SM, Zoloth L (2007) Synthesising biosecurity. Bull At Sci
63(6):16–18
Meselson M, Robinson J (2001) HSP draft convention to prohibit
biological and chemical weapons under international criminal
law. http://www.fas.harvard.edu/*hsp/crim01.pdf
National Research Council (2006) Globalization, biosecurity, and the
future of the life sciences. Committee on Advances in Technol-
ogy and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation
Biowarfare Threats. The National Academies Press, Washington,
DC
O’Malley MA, Powell A, Davies JF, Calvert J (2008) Knowledge-
making distinctions in synthetic biology. BioEssays 30:57–65
Petro JB, Plasse TR, McNulty JA (2003) Biotechnology: impact on
biological warfare and biodefense. Biosecur Bioterror: Biodef,
Strategy, Pract Sci 1(3):161–168
Rodemeyer M (2009) New life, old bottles. Regulating ﬁrst-gener-
ation products of synthetic biology, Woodrow Wilson Center
for International Scholars, Report Synbio 2. http://www.synbio
project.org/process/assets/ﬁles/6319/nano_synbio2_electronic_
ﬁnal.pdf
Salerno RM, Gaudioso J (2007) Laboratory biosecurity handbook.
CRC Press, Boca Raton
Schmidt M (2009) Synthetic biosafety: do I understand what I can
create? Presentation at the conference applied industrial biology
in Europe—status quo and perspectives, Freiburg, Germany, 17
April
Schmidt M et al (eds) (2009) Synthetic biology. The technoscience
and its societal implications. Springer, forthcoming
Sprinzak E (2000) On not overstating the problem. In: Roberts B (ed)
Hype or reality: the ‘‘new terrorism’’ and mass casualty attacks.
CBACI, Alexandria
SYNBIOSAFE (2008) Compilation of all SYNBIOSAFE e-confe-
rence contributions. http://www.synbiosafe.eu/uploads/synbiosafe_
e-conference_all_contributions.pdf
SYNBIOSAFE (2009) Synthetic biology priority paper. IDC, Vienna
Tucker JB (2000) Toxic terror. Assessing the terrorist use of chemical
and biological weapons. MIT Press, Cambridge
Wheelis M (1999) Biological sabotage in World War I. In: Geissler E,
Moon JEVC (eds) Biological and toxin weapons: research,
development and use from the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI
chemical&biologicalwarfarestudies18.OUP,Oxford,pp35–62
Wheelis M, Rozsa L, Dando M (eds) (2006) Deadly cultures.
Biological weapons since 1945. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge
1540 Committee webpage (2007) http://www.un.org/sc/1540/index.
shtml
90 A. Kelle
123